We first model the variants of OAEP and SAEP by changing a construction and position of a redundancy, and establish a universal proof technique in the random oracle model, the comprehensive event dividing tree. We then make a taxonomical security consideration of the variants of OAEP and SAEP, based on the assumptions of one-wayness and partial-domain one-wayness of the encryption permutation, by applying the tree. Furthermore, we demonstrate the concrete attack procedures against all insecure schemes; we insist that the security proof failure leads to some attacks. From the security consideration, we find that one of the variants leads to a scheme without the redundancy; the scheme is not PA (plaintext aware) but IND-CCA2 secure. Finally, we conclude that some of them are practical in terms of security tightness and short bandwidth.
Introduction

Background
In 1994, Bellare and Rogaway proposed a secure encryption padding scheme, OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding, [3] ), using the trapdoor one-way permutation (e.g., the RSA function [14] ). OAEP first pads a plaintext and then applies a trapdoor one-way permutation to the intermediate result in order to obtain the ciphertext.
Bellare and Rogaway [3] claimed that OAEP provided high-level security (IND-CCA2); however, Shoup [15] demonstrated that it lacks IND-CCA2 security under the assumption of the one-wayness of the encryption permutation by giving an attack as a counter example against the security. In [15] , Shoup also proposed an alternative padding scheme, OAEP+, in which the padding information (the construction of redundancy and its location) of OAEP was changed, and proved that OAEP+ is IND-CCA2 secure under the assumption of the one-wayness of the permutation.
On the other hand, Fujisaki et al. [8] showed that OAEP can recover IND-CCA2 security, by strengthening the assumption of the encryption permutation from the one- † † The author is with the University of Electro-Communications, Chofu-shi, 182-8585 Japan.
* The proceedings version of this paper [11] appeared in Sixth International Conference on Information and Communications Security (ICICS'04).
a) E-mail: yuichi1.komano@toshiba.co.jp DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a. 5.1233 wayness to the partial-domain one-wayness. Fujisaki et al. [8] proved the security of OAEP by utilizing the eventbased technique, in which the reduction algorithm modifies the adversary's view, divides an event into several events (which reduce the success probability), and estimates all the probabilities. However, their proof does not clearly identify the factors that cause the reduction efficiency to deteriorate, that is, there might be a possibility of tighter reduction. To improve OAEP [3] , besides OAEP+ [15] , several padding schemes have been proposed: OAEP++ by Kobara and Imai [9] , SAEP and SAEP+ by Boneh [4] , etc. OAEP++ employs the same padding technique as OAEP, but the input of an encryption permutation is different from that of OAEP, and it is IND-CCA2 secure under the assumption of the one-wayness. SAEP and SAEP+ reduce the number of times a hash function must be used by one compared to OAEP and OAEP+, respectively; however, they are not IND-CCA2 secure under the assumption of the one-wayness of the permutation.
Our Contribution
First, we systematically model the variation of OAEP and SAEP: A review of the history of OAEP and its improvements reveals that its variants can be constructed by changing the padding information (construction of the redundancy and its location) and the input-range of the encryption permutation. We exhaustively change the padding information of OAEP and SAEP to construct OAEP-pm and SAEP-pm, respectively. Here, the first 'p' (position) is substituted by A ∼ F which means the position of the redundancy, and the second 'm' (method) is substituted by 0 ∼ 3 which means the input data of the redundancy (hereafter we call it the padding information). Moreover, we change the input-range of the permutation to obtain xOAEP-pm, OAEPx-pm, xSAEP-pm, and SAEPx-pm, where the position of x indicates the position of input-range of the permutation. We specify the redundancy construction rule by substituting a symbol for 'pm' field; for example, OAEP-A0, OAEP-B3, xOAEP-A0, SAEP-A0, and SAEP-A3 represent original OAEP, OAEP+, OAEP++, SAEP, and SAEP+, respectively.
Second, we refine the methodology of security proof of [8] to construct a comprehensive event dividing tree (systematic proof technique, Fig. 3 ). Our analysis, in which we employ this technique, leads to proofs of OAEP and OAEP+ that give the tight security.
Third, we prove the security of all the above-mentioned
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variations by utilizing the systematic proof technique. We first discuss the security of all the variants with an one-way permutation. We then consider the security of OAEP-pm with a partial-domain one-way permutation. Note that our comprehensive event dividing technique can be utilized for other cases (see Appendix A for the padding scheme without the redundancy, and Appendix B for the case under the restricted assumption to the permutation). Moreover, we point out the concrete attack procedures against insecure schemes: if the security proof fails for some variant, there must be an attack on the variant. Throughout the security consideration, we find that three of the variants (OAEP-D0, OAEP-E0, and OAEP-F0) are provided neither the security proofs nor specific attacks. In Appendix B, we prove that we cannot prove the security of OAEP-D0 under the assumption of the partial-domain one-wayness and that there is no attack against OAEP-D0 if the partial-domain oneway permutation is utilized. Moreover, by strengthening the assumption of the partial-domain permutation, we prove that OAEP-D0, OAEP-E0, and OAEP-F0 are IND-CCA2 secure: we assume a partial-domain one-way permutation against partial-domain plaintext checking attack (pd-PChA) and partial-domain plaintext comparing attack (pd-PCoA). This proof is only theoretical interest and it remains a future work to find weaker assumption than the partial-domain one-wayness against pd-PChA and pd-PCoA to prove the security of OAEP-D0, OAEP-E0, and OAEP-F0. Fourth, from the security consideration, we find that one of them (xOAEP-F0) can be changed into an IND-CCA2 scheme, xOAEP without redundancy (xOAEPwoR), under the assumption of the one-wayness of the permutation. Note that xOAEPwoR is not plaintext aware (PA). For the related work, Bellare and Rogaway [3] constructed the basic scheme, OAEP without redundancy (OAEPwoR), and claimed that OAEPwoR is IND-CCA2 secure and is not PA; however, we find that OAEPwoR is neither PA nor IND-CCA2 secure, under the assumption of the onewayness of the permutation. Reference [1] pointed out that IND-CCA2 does not leads to the PA by constructing a pathological example (scheme) which is not PA but IND-CCA2 secure. It is proven that xOAEPwoR is a simple (natural) example † : which is of theoretical interest. In Appendix A, we prove that xOAEPwoR is IND-CCA2 secure by applying the comprehensive event dividing tree. We can also construct OAEPx without redundancy (OAEPxwoR); in Appendix A, we claim that OAEPxwoR is IND-CCA1 secure.
Finally, we compare all variants of OAEP (72 variants) and of SAEP (48 ones) in terms of security and practical use. From the comparison, with regard to PA schemes, we conclude that xOAEP-A0 (OAEP++ [9] ), xOAEP-F2, and xOAEP-F3 are practical in terms of the security tightness (PA and IND-CCA2), fast implementation, and short bandwidth.
Note:
Recently, Phan and Pointcheval [13] proposed a 3-round OAEP without redundancy in order to achieve an IND-CCA2 security with probabilistic OW-PCA (one-way against plaintext checking attack) primitives (e.g., ElGamal encryption [6] ). In this paper, we utilize deterministic encryption scheme (e.g., RSA) as a primitive, following the construction strategy of (original) OAEP, and only deal with the variants of 1 and 2-round OAEP (SAEP and OAEP, respectively).
Definitions
We first review a model of a public key encryption scheme and a notion of security, called IND (indistinguishability against passive/adaptive attacks) [1] , in the random oracle model [2] .
Definition 1 (public key encryption)
A public key encryption scheme with random (hash) function(s) H consists of the following three algorithms, (K, E, D).
-Key generation algorithm K is a probabilistic algorithm which, given a security parameter k, outputs a key pair of public and private keys, K(1 k ) = (pk, sk). We also define that the encryption scheme is We then review the assumption of the permutation; one-wayness and partial-domain one-wayness.
-Encryption algorithm
be a permutation. We define that -f is (τ, )-one-way, if an arbitrary adversary whose running time is bounded by τ has success probability of 
Models of Variants of OAEP and SAEP
We first give the definitions of padding information, and then, model the variation of OAEP and SAEP, xOAEPx-pm and xSAEPx-pm, respectively. Padding Information: In this paper, we assume four constructions of the redundancy w; "0" (w = 0 k 1 ), "1"
(w = H (x)), "2" (w = H (r)), and "3" (w = H (r||x)), where H is a hash function whose output length is k 1 . For ciphertext y, a receiver recovers x and r, and outputs x if the padding information w is valid or ⊥ otherwise. xOAEPx-pm: OAEP-pm, xOAEP-pm, and OAEPx-pm use the same padding scheme; the difference between them is the input-range of the encryption permutation f . For each scheme, we substitute one of four items of padding information from 0 to 3 described above for one of six locations from A to F (see Fig. 1 ). With regard to this model, we can consider 72 variants of OAEP. Let G, H, and H be hash functions † , and let f : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k be a trapdoor permutation. In order to encrypt x ∈ {0, 1} k 2 with these schemes, we first choose random string r ∈ {0, 1} k 0 and pad x and r by using the padding information w in some location to compute padding s||t. Finally, we regard f (s||t) in OAEP-pm, f (s)||t in xOAEP-pm, and s|| f (t) in OAEPx-pm as ciphertexts † † , respectively. We simply describe OAEP-pm, xOAEP-pm, and OAEPx-pm by xOAEPx-pm, hereafter. xSAEPx-pm: SAEP-pm, xSAEP-pm, and SAEPx-pm use the same padding technique, as in xOAEPx-pm (see Fig. 2 ). In order to encrypt x ∈ {0, 1} k 2 with these schemes, we also first choose random string r ∈ {0, 1} k 0 and pad x and r by † The input and/or output length of the hash functions are different for each scheme, but the output length of H is k 1 .
† † We can generalize the input-range of the permutation more flexible like [9] . The genius of xOAEP-pm is that the input-range of f is equal to or the part of s. In these cases, we can consider the security of xOAEP-pm in the same manner. Similarly, the genius of OAEPx is that the input-range of f is equal to or the part of t. The other case, where the input-range of f includes the parts of s and t, is essentially the same as OAEP-pm. using the padding information w in some location to compute padding s||t. Eventually, we regard f (s||t) in SAEP-pm, f (s)||t in xSAEP-pm, and s|| f (t) in SAEPx-pm as ciphertexts, respectively.
With regard to this model, we can consider 48 variants of SAEP. We also simply describe SAEP-pm, xSAEP-pm, and SAEPx-pm by xSAEPx-pm, hereafter.
Universal Proof Technique for OAEP Variants
In this section, we construct a universal proof technique by refining the event dividing method of [8] .
We explain the strategy of the security proof with one of the variants, OAEP-B3 (OAEP+), and construct the event dividing tree; it can be extended to prove the security of (all) variants of OAEP and SAEP, since the strategy of the security proofs for the variants are essentially the same.
Note that this technique is one of the proof techniques and may take a secure variant for an insecure one. We therefore give attacks against the variants which are not ensured the security with this technique. This concludes the classification of the variants into four security levels † (breakable with CPA, IND-CPA secure, IND-CCA1 secure, and IND-CCA2 secure).
High Level Description of Security Proof of OAEP-B3 (OAEP+)
In order to prove the security of OAEP-B3, we must show that if there exists an adversary A to OAEP-B3, we can construct the inverter I who can invert the trapdoor one-way permutation f with regard to any y + by utilizing A as an oracle. In utilizing A as an oracle, I must answer to the queries output by A described in section 3, adequately.
Assume that I is invoked with y + as an input. In order to compute f −1 (y + ), I feeds A with y + as the target ciphertext deviating from the encryption protocol (instead of E(x b ) with random b ∈ {0, 1}). Let s + , t + , w + , r + , and x + denote the corresponding elements of y + in OAEP-B3. I's hidden agenda is as follows: In order for A to distinguish the target ciphertext successfully, A should query s + to H and r
) by searching the inputoutput lists of H and G, respectively.
With regard to hash queries (G-query, H-query, and Hquery), in principal, I simulates an answer at random. In answering these queries, I maintains the input-output lists. About the decryption query (D-query), I looks up the inputoutput lists to answer the plaintext. Let y be a D-query output by A, and s, t, r, w, x be the corresponding elements to y. In order for y to be valid, s and r must be queried to H and G, respectively (see the following section). Namely, if y is valid, I can answer x by searching the lists for s and r such that f (s||(r ⊕ H(s))) = y and H (r, x) = w.
Without loss of generality, we can consider the following events: AskG and AskH are the events in which adversary A queries G and H about r + and s + , respectively, and let AskHG = AskH ∧ AskG. Let A = b be the event in which A succeeds in guessing b correctly, and let Succ ow (τ ) be the probability with which I succeeds in outputting f −1 (y + ) within the time bound τ . EBad denotes the event in which A notices the deviation of encryption protocol, i.e., A notices either that x + is different from x b for b = 0 and 1, or that w + is not the valid padding information. Let DBad be the event in which I fails to simulate D, and let Bad = EBad ∨ DBad. With regard to these notations, if AskHG happens, I can find f −1 (y + ) = s + ||t + by locating them from the input-output lists of G and H, and Pr[AskHG] ≤ Succ ow (τ ) holds † † . Therefore, our aim is to estimate Pr[AskHG] by using an adversary's advantage .
Comprehensive Event Dividing Tree
We first divide event AskHG into disjoint events, AskHG ∧ Bad and AskHG ∧ ¬Bad. This yields
For the first term of equation (1), since Bad = EBad∨DBad, we can estimate Pr[AskHG ∧ Bad] as follows:
For the second term of equation (1), it is meaningful to consider the advantage of A because of the condition ¬Bad. We evaluate Pr[AskHG ∧ ¬Bad] as follows:
With regard to the first term of inequality (3), we have
With regard to the second term of inequality (3), we evaluate
(5) † With regard to OAEP-D0, OAEP-E0, and OAEP-F0, we can prove that there is no security proof nor attack. See Appendix B for details.
† † This inequality holds for sufficiently large τ ; which is bounded by τ If Pr[A = b|¬AskHG ∧ ¬Bad] in equation (5) is estimated by holds, and then, we have
Hence, by substituting inequalities (2) and (6) into inequality (1), we have 
In this estimation, we have Pr[Fail ∧ AskRS] = 0, because the definition of AskRS allows I to work as the real decryption oracle, since I always outputs f −1 (y) by locating s and r in the input-output lists.
We estimate the remaining term of equation (8), Pr [Fail ∧ ¬AskRS] . From the definition of AskRS, since ¬AskRS is divided into ¬AskR∨(AskR∧¬AskS) disjointly, we have To conclude, in order to estimate the probability of (c) ((d) and (e)) described in the previous section, we only have to estimate the following (g) and (h) ((g') and (h'), and (g") and (h"), respectively). 
From the above discussions, we obtain the comprehensive event dividing tree as shown in Fig. 3. 
Security Results of OAEP+ (OAEP-B3)
We utilize the comprehensive event dividing tree to prove the security of OAEP+. Note that we can utilize this tree to prove the security of OAEP and the result is (slightly) tighter than those proven in [8] .
Theorem 1 (OAEP+)
Let A be a CCA2-adversary against the indistinguishability of OAEP+ encryption scheme (K, E, D 
Here, we denote the complexity of a calculation f by T f .
In order to prove Theorem 1, we should prove that (a), (g), and (h) are negligible, and that (f) equals 1 2 : We can estimate that (a), (g), and (h) are less than
, respectively, and that (f) equals 
The above theorem shows that OAEP+ has tight security (Succ ow ≈ ); Shoup [15] proved that the order of the reduction is Succ ow ≈ 2 , namely, we succeed in giving the double security tightness † .
Security Considerations
This section applies the systematic proof technique (Fig. 3 ) to all variants of OAEP and SAEP, and discusses the relation between the security proof failure and the attack procedure.
Security Results
Based on the One-Wayness Table 1 summarizes the security result of xOAEPx-pm and xSAEPx-pm, under the assumption of the one-wayness, respectively. For each variant in these tables, the upper column expresses the security level against indistinguishability. × denotes that the corresponding variant is not secure against the chosen plaintext attack (CPA). The lower column shows the cause(s) of security proof failure, if one more higher level is stipulated. For example, OAEPx-B2 is IND-CCA1 secure; however, if we try to give the security proof for IND-CCA2, (e): Pr[DBad|¬AskG] is not negligible and the security proof fails. Here, ( ) means the case that, the variant does not satisfy the indistinguishability at all. In xSAEP-Dm (xSAEPFm), random string r is not masked, and then, the attacker can distinguish the target ciphertext f (s * )||t * by recovering † Shoup proved the security of OAEP+ by constructing Games. We can prove that OAEP+ has tight security not only by the comprehensive dividing proof technique but also the Game constructing technique [10] . 
The above example says that the variants, whose security is not ensured because of ( ), may be secure under the assumption of the partial-domain one-wayness of the permutation (discussed in section 5.3).
With regard to the reduction efficiency for each (secure) scheme, the order of success probability Succ ow (τ ) of I is for all variants, where denotes the success probability of A. For running time τ of I for OAEP-pm, since I must search the input-output lists for the pair (s + , r + ), respectively, the order of τ is τ + q H q G T f , where τ is a running time of A and T f denotes the time complexity of f ; whereas, for xOAEP-pm and OAEPx-pm, since I searches the input-output lists for s + or H(s + ) ⊕ r + , respectively, the order of τ is τ + q H T f or τ + q G T f . Namely, xOAEP-pm and OAEPx-pm have tighter security than OAEP-pm.
Attacks Versus Proofs
This subsection discusses the relation † between the existence of attack and the reason of the security proof failure.
We can classify the attack procedures into three classes: One class is a CPA (chosen plaintext attack) which is carried out for variants having one of the proof failure causes among (a), (b), (f), (f'), and (f") in Table 1 . There are two-type attacks in this class. One of them corresponds (a) and (b), and the other corresponds (f), (f'), and (f"). For the former case, we give an attack procedure (example) for OAEP-C0. Let us assume thatf : {0, 1} [15] , which is performed for variants having one of the proof failure causes among (d) and (e). For example, in OAEPx-B3, let us assume a special one-way permutation for which f (t ⊕ h) is easily computed from f (t) and h. Given the target ciphertext s * || f (t * ) as a ciphertext corresponding to one of challenges, x 0 and
) and then queries s || f (t ) to the decryption oracle. When the oracle answers x , A computes x = x ⊕ ∆ and outputs b
The other class is an attack to the variants whose security is not ensured because of ( ). For these variants, we give an attack by assuming the permutation which is one-way but partially invertible. Let outputting b such that x = x b . Note that if it is infeasible to break a partial-domain one-wayness of the encryption permutation, the above attack does not make sense (see the next subsection). The above consideration implies that the security proof failure corresponds directly to the attack procedure. Moreover, the consideration to the third class of the attack implicates that some of the variants (for which ( ) spoils the security) may retrieve the security under the assumption of the partial-domain one-wayness. The next subsection discusses the security of OAEP-pm based on the partial-domain onewayness.
Security Results of OAEP-pm Based on the PartialDomain One-Wayness
We then consider the security of OAEP-pm based on the partial-domain one-wayness of the trapdoor permutation.
Since the partial-domain one-wayness is a stronger assumption than the one-wayness, the scheme which is proven to be secure under the assumption of only the partial-domain onewayness is less practical. Namely, to consider the security under the assumption of the partial-domain one-wayness is of theoretical interest; in this section, we discuss only the case for OAEP-pm. Note that we can apply the comprehensive event dividing tree to this case. Our aim is to estimate Pr[AskH]; therefore, we should discuss the probability (a), (c), (d), and (f'). Table 2 summarizes the security results and the reason for the security proof failure of OAEP-pm based on the partial-domain one-wayness about s. Table 2 shows that the implication described in the previous subsection is right: OAEP-E2, OAEP-E3, OAEP-F2, and OAEP-F3 retrieve IND-CCA2 security. As for OAEP-C2 and OAEP-C3, if we utilize a partial-domain one-way permutation about [s] k 2 , these schemes can get rid of IND-CCA2 security. Moreover, OAEP-A0, OAEP-D1, OAEP-D2, OAEP-D3, and OAEP-E1 redeem the IND-CCA2 security. Intuitively, from the viewpoint of the security proof, this is be- † The attack procedure is not always identical to the proof failure, since the aims of attack and proof are distinct. For example, let us consider the attacker against the variant which is not ensured its security since (f)Pr[A = b|¬AskH ∧ ¬Bad] is not equal to 1 2 (e.g., OAEPx-C1; the attack procedure is in this subsection). Note that it is not essential for the attacker to be or not to be restricted with ¬AskH. 
cause an attacker cannot notice the simulation (deviation) before the attacker queries s * to H (AskH). With regard to OAEP-D0, OAEP-E0, and OAEP-F0, however, it becomes clear that we cannot prove the security under the assumption of the partial-domain one-wayness of the permutation nor find any concrete attack against them. For these variants, we can prove the security by strengthening the assumption of the permutation; the partial-domain one-wayness against the plaintext checking and comparing attacks (see Appendix B).
Discussion
We discuss the security of variants and select the best variants considering the security and their efficiency. Under the assumption of the one-wayness of the permutation, we have 24 IND-CCA2 variants (see Table 1 ). As we noted, the success probability of an inverter I is the same for all variants, Succ ow (τ ) ≈ ; whereas its running time for OAEP-pm is longer than those for xOAEP-pm, OAEPx-pm, and SAEPxpm. Therefore, the security of xOAEP-pm, OAEPx-pm, and SAEPx-pm is tighter than that of OAEP-pm.
From Table 1 , we find that xOAEP-F0 satisfies IND-CCA2 under the assumption of the one-wayness. In xOAEP-F0, the redundancy w = 0 k 1 is attached with r⊕H(s) without being permuted: which implies that the redundancy does not improve the security, i.e., that xOAEP without redundancy (xOAEPwoR † , see Appendix A for details) may also satisfy IND-CCA2.
Indeed, we can prove the security of xOAEPwoR in accordance with IND-CCA2 under the assumption of the one-wayness. xOAEPwoR is a practical scheme, because of its security tightness, short bandwidth (= max{k, k 2 } + k 0 ); whereas the bandwidth of OAEPx-pm and SAEPx-pm is
Note that xOAEPwoR is not PA † † ; however, the security proof indicates that it is infeasible to generate a ciphertext corresponding to meaningful plaintext, without following the encryption procedure. Bellare and Rogaway [3] constructed the basic scheme (following our notation, the scheme is denoted by OAEPwoR, see Appendix A for details) which is not PA. They insisted that the OAEPwoR satisfies IND-CCA2, however, we can apply the secondclass attack (see section 5.2) to find that OAEPwoR is not secure under the assumption of the one-wayness.
In the case of a PA scheme, xOAEP-A0 (OAEP++), xOAEP-F2, and xOAEP-F3 are practical. xOAEP-A0 has the tighter security and shorter bandwidth (max{k 2 + k 1 , k} + k 0 bits) compared to OAEPx-pm and SAEPx-pm. xOAEP-F2 and xOAEP-F3 also have tight security; and moreover, the bandwidth is short compared to OAEPx-pm and SAEPxpm, and is the same as xOAEP-A0 (k 2 + k 0 + k 1 bits) if the length of plaintext is greater than the key length (k 2 > k). Furthermore, in xOAEP-F2 and xOAEP-F3, if we compute H (r) and H (r||x) in parallel with G(r), we can realize a fast implementation: in xOAEP-A0, we have the waiting time in computing 0
Conclusion
In this paper, we systematically modeled variants of OAEP and SAEP and established the systematic proof technique, the comprehensive event dividing tree. Utilizing the technique, we doubled the reduction efficiency of OAEP+, obtained 24 IND-CCA2 secure variants under the assumption of the one-wayness, and discussed the relation between a security proof failure and an attack procedure. Finally, we compared the variants and found that we have the IND-CCA2 secure scheme without redundancy (xOAEPwoR), and that, as PA and IND-CCA2 secure schemes, xOAEP-A0, xOAEP-F2, and xOAEP-F3 are practical in terms of the security tightness and short bandwidth. that any attacker can easily create a (valid) ciphertext by generating a random string; of course, it is an accident that the corresponding plaintext is a meaningful data. Moreover, the second-class attack (section 5.2) shows that OAEPwoR is not IND-CCA2 secure under the assumption of the onewayness.
Security of xOAEPwoR:
In the case of security of xOAEPwoR, xOAEPwoR is not PA in the same manner as for OAEPwoR; however, xOAEPwoR is IND-CCA2 secure. It is essential that, in order to prevent from the second-class attack, we have to make any attacker be unable to invert s from the ciphertext, e.g., applying a one-way permutation only to s. The following theorem holds.
Theorem 2 (Security of xOAEPwoR) Let A be a CCA2-adversary against the indistinguishability of xOAEPwoR encryption scheme (K, E, D). Assume that A has advantage within time bound τ and makes at most q G , q H , and q D queries to the random oracles and the decryption oracle, G, H, and D, respectively. Then,
Succ ow (τ ) ≥ − 2q D (q G +q D )+q G +q D 2 k 0 . τ ≤ τ + q H · (T f + O(1)).
Here, we denote the complexity of a calculation f by T f .
Proof : In order to prove Theorem 2, we construct an inverter I which, given f and c + , utilizes an adversary A against xOAEPwoR to outputs s n, s, h, c, x) . s and h are query and answer of H-query, respectively; and n indicates the trigger of the simulation, in the same manner as G-List. c(= f (s)) and x are ciphertext and plaintext, respectively. r, g, 0) into G-List, and return g 
If ( * , s φ, h, c, * ) ∈ H-List
then r := h ⊕ t, and return φ, h, c, x) into H-List, and return x 
Simulation for G-query r, H-query s, and i-th D-query c||t (1 ≤ i ≤ q D ):
I simulates the answers for the queries output by A as shown in Figs. A· 2, A· 3, and A· 4. Here, Abort means that I fails to simulate the A's view. Analysis: In order to estimate the success probability of I, we apply the modified comprehensive event dividing tree (Fig. A· 1) . The differences between the original tree ( Fig. 3) and the modified one (A· 1) are followings: For xOAEPwoR, I wins if A queries s + to H (AskH). Therefore, AskHG in Fig. 3 is replaced by AskH in Fig. A· 1 . Moreover, in this proof, A may notice the deviation in the simulation for the answer to G-query (Fig. A· 2) . We call the case GBad, and consider the probability Pr[ GBad ∧ ¬AskH]. Namely, we should estimate the probability (a), (c), (d), and (f') in section 4 0, φ, h, c, x) ∈ H-List, since H is a random oracle, h = H( f −1 (c)) is uniformly distributed in {0, 1} k 0 in the A's view. Therefore, ( * , h ⊕ t, * , * ) is in G-List by accident. Therefore,
to H nor notice the deviation (did not query r + to G); since H and G are assumed to be random oracles, G(r + ) is uniformly distributed in {0, 1} k 2 . In this case, the probability for the case where A correctly guesses b is estimated by 1 2 . Pr[ GBad ∧ ¬AskH]: For (n > 0, r, φ, * ) ∈ G-List, since H is a random oracle, r is uniformly distributed in {0, 1} k 0 in the A's view. Therefore, A queries r to G with probability at most 1
Therefore, Theorem 2 holds.
Remark: Reference [1] pointed out that IND-CCA2 does not lead to the PA by constructing a pathological example which is not PA but IND-CCA2 secure. Reference [7] introduced the plaintext simulatability (PS) in order to show the separation between the IND-CCA2 security and PA. Reference [7] also gave a concrete scheme which is not PA but PS (and IND-CCA2 secure). The construction of [7] is simpler (more natural) than that of [1] . It is theoretically interesting that xOAEPwoR is also another and simpler example compared to [1] .
Security of OAEPxwoR:
The security of OAEPxwoR is the same as that of OAEPx-C0, since the redundancy 0 k 1 in OAEPx-C0 is not masked nor permuted and does not include any information about the plaintext, namely, since it does not contribute the security at all. Therefore, OAEPxwoR is IND-CCA1 secure.
Appendix B: Security of OAEP-D0, OAEP-E0, and OAEP-F0
In this section, we reconsider the security of OAEP-D0, OAEP-E0, and OAEP-F0. At first, we show that there is neither security proof nor attack for these schemes. We then discuss the security of OAEP-D0 and OAEP-F0: We introduce the other oracles which are utilized in strengthening the assumption of the partial-domain one-way permutations, then discuss their security with this strong assumption; which is of theoretical interest.
B.1 Absence of Proofs and Attacks
This subsection shows that there is neither security proof nor attack for OAEP-D0, OAEP-E0, and OAEP-F0.
B.1.1 Impossibility of Proving Security
We explain the reason why we cannot prove the security for each scheme.
OAEP-D0 and OAEP-E0: OAEP-D0 and OAEP-E0 are proven to be IND-CPA secure under the assumption of the partial-domain one-wayness; however, we cannot prove their security in CCA1 and CCA2 attackers below. Let A be an attacker against OAEP-D0. Assume that A makes a decryption query y as follows: A randomly chooses s ∈ {0, 1} k 1 and t ∈ {0, 1} k 0 , queries s to H, sets
. A then chooses valid ciphertext y 1 or invalid ciphertext y 2 with probability 1 2 and outputs it as a decryption query y. The inverter I, however, cannot distinguish y is valid or not, therefore, I can answer the query properly with the probability at most 1 2 . Hence, we cannot prove the security of OAEP-D0. The similar discussion can be done for OAEP-E0.
OAEP-F0:
In OAEP-F0, the redundancy 0
In the security proof, note that the aim of the inverter I is to find [
k by utilizing an attacker A as an oracle. In order to run A, I should inputs a target ciphertext y * such that [ f −1 (y * )] k 1 equals 0 k 1 ; however, it is impossible for I to find such y * related to y + , e.g., y * = zy + for some z ∈ {0, 1} k , in polynomial time. Therefore, we cannot prove the security of OAEP-F0.
B.1.2 Impossibility of Mounting Attacks
Let us consider the most advantageous attack scenario. Note that the permutation is partial-domain one-way about s
The scenario seems to be one in which the attacker can control [ f −1 (y * )] k 0 +k 1 . This scenario means that, for the attacker, the most advantageous partial-domain oneway permutation f (s||t) is f (s)||t where f is one-way permutation. With this f , OAEP-D0, OAEP-E0, and OAEP-F0 is essentially the same as xOAEP-D0, xOAEP-E0, and xOAEP-F0, respectively, which are IND-CCA2 secure. Since the attacker cannot mount an attack in the most advantageous scenario, we can conclude that there is no attack against these schemes.
B.2 Reconsideration of OAEP-D0 and OAEP-E0
In this section, we show that OAEP-D0 and OAEP-E0 are proven to be IND-CCA2 secure if we strengthen the assumption of the partial-domain one-way permutation. Note that the discussion cannot be applicable for OAEP-F0.
We first consider the reason why we cannot prove the security of OAEP-D0 and OAEP-E0 nor give attacks against them. We then introduce more restricted assumption of the partial-domain one-wayness against the partial-domain plaintext checking attack (pd-PChA) and the partial-domain plaintext comparing attack (pd-PCoA).
B.2.1 Why the Security of Them Is Not Separated
Note that OAEP-D0 and OAEP-E0 are IND-CPA secure. The following implies that these schemes are also IND-CCA1 secure: The target ciphertext y * depends on the randomness r * chosen by a challenger with whom an adversary A interacts. A cannot control nor guess r * at all; therefore, the information gathered in the attack (CCA1) does not seem to help A in distinguishing target ciphertext y * . We then discuss the security proof failure in these schemes (i.e., as shown in Table 1 ; (c) is not negligible). Let us consider the construction of an inverter I in section 3. y denotes the decryption query output by A, and s, t, and r denote the corresponding elements of y. Note that A can construct a valid ciphertext y as long as A queries H about s, without querying r to G.
For decryption query y, I should reject y if s is not queried to H; it is only by accident that [H(s)
Unfortunately, because of the partial-domain one-wayness of f , I, given y, cannot find whether s = [ f −1 (y)] k 2 has been already queried to H or not. Therefore, I cannot answer the decryption query appropriately.
B.2.2 pd-PChO and pd-PCoO
We introduce the new oracles, the partial-domain plaintext checking oracle (pd-PChO) and the partial-domain plaintext comparing oracle (pd-PCoO).
The pd-PChO is similar to the plaintext checking oracle of [12] . The pd-PChO, given permutation f and strings y and s, outputs 1 if s is partial-domain of f −1 (y) and 0 if not. The pd-PCoO, given permutation f and strings y and y , outputs 1 if partial-domains of f −1 (y) and f −1 (y ) are equal and 0 if not.
See section B.3 for details of these oracles. Note that, the real decryptor who can invert f is able to play a role of these oracles. B.2.3 Partial-Domain One-Wayness against pd-PChA and
pd-PCoA
We utilize the pd-PChO. By using pd-PChO, I seems to be able to relate s = [ f −1 (y)] k 2 to the past query to H. We call a permutation is partial-domain one-way against pd-PChA if any adversary who can utilize pd-PChO cannot invert the partial-domain one-way permutation. In fact, we can prove that OAEP-D0 and OAEP-E0 are IND-CCA1 secure by assuming the partial-domain one-wayness against pd-PChA.
With regard to IND-CCA2 security, however, the assumption of partial-domain one-wayness against pd-PChA is not sufficient. + by using pd-PChO, I cannot find s + . We then utilize the pd-PCoO. Similarly, we also call a permutation is partial-domain one-way against pd-PChA&pd-PCoA if any adversary who can utilize pd-PChO&pd-PCoO cannot invert the partial-domain onewayness. By assuming a partial-domain one-way permutation against pd-PChA&pd-PCoA, we can finally prove that OAEP-D0 and OAEP-E0 are IND-CCA2 secure.
B.3 Security Proof of OAEP-D0
The security result of OAEP-D0 under the assumption of the partial-domain one-wayness against pd-PChA&pd-PCoA is as follows:
Theorem 3 (Security result of OAEP-D0)
Let A be an adversary that breaks OAEP-D0 in (τ, q D , q G , q H , ) in the sense of IND-CCA2. Then we can break the partial-domain one-wayness of the permutation by using pd-PChO and pdpcot within time bound τ and with success probability
where T f denotes the time complexity of f .
Proof : We give a construction of inverter I which, given a permutation f and string y + , outputs s
, by using pd-PChO, pd-PCoO, and an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that breaks OAEP-D0 in (τ, q D , q G , q H , ) in accordance with IND-CCA2. pd-PChO and pd-PCoO: Let us discuss pd-PChO and pd-PCoO in detail. Assume that a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 are strings with length k 2 , k 0 , and k 1 bits, respectively. Moreover, for string y ∈ {0, 1} k 2 +k 0 +k 1 , assume that z 1 , z 2 , and z 3 are strings such that z 1 ||z 2 ||z 3 = f −1 (y) where |z 1 | = k 2 , |z 2 | = k 0 , and |z 3 | = k 1 . Using these notations, we classify the oracles: pd-PChO i (a i , y) outputs 1 if a i = z i and 0 otherwise. With this notation, the aim of I is to output s such that pd-PChO 1 (s, y + ) = 1. With regard to pd-PCoO, pd-PCoO i (y, y ) outputs 1 if z i = z i and 0 otherwise.
Lists:
We introduces five lists in order to simulate answers consistently; G-List, H-List, G -List, C-List, and D-List. G-List contains a pair of query and response, (r||0
). H-List contains a pair of query and response, (s, H(s) ). G -List contains a quadruplet (y, s, H(s), G(r||0 k 1 )); the quadruplet is added into G -List whenever we define G(r||0 k 1 ) implicitly in the simulation of the decryption oracle. C-List contains a triplet of valid ciphertext y, r, and s; we compute y = f (s||H(s) ⊕ (r||0 In OAEP-D0, EBad denotes the event in which A notices that w 
